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This paper examines the role of a taxpayer’s intention in the way certain transactions will be 
taxed.  The paper will examine the weight accorded to a taxpayer’s stated intention in 
different situations (i.e. in what situations/ transactions will a taxpayer’s intention have 
comparatively little weight when compared to the objective facts of the case?)  
 The paper first ascertains the meaning of intention/purpose/motive in terms of the 
Income Tax Act, 58 of 1962 as amended, (hereafter referred to as “the Act”).  The question is 
whether these words are synonymous or have separate and discrete meanings.   
 The paper then looks at the typical areas of difficulty associated with a taxpayer’s 
intention.  Share disposals are one example discussed, as it is often difficult to determine 
whether these disposals are of a capital or revenue nature.     
 The weight accorded to a taxpayer’s intention in schemes involving tax avoidance is 
also discussed. Case law surrounding section 20A and section 80A-S80L of the Act are 
reviewed to ascertain how a taxpayer’s intention is dealt with in these sections.  
 
II  INTENTION/MOTIVE/PURPOSE 
The intention of a taxpayer is a common theme that permeates a number of issues 
surrounding tax law.  It is often referred to as the taxpayer’s ipse dixit and provides varying 
degrees of importance in determining how a particular scheme or transaction will be taxed.1
 A taxpayer’s intention is invariably of a subjective nature and is influenced by a 
number of factors that may be unique to a particular case.  The taxpayer themselves may be 
uncertain as to their intention when entering into a particular transaction. It is impractical to 
think that a taxpayer, however genuine and honest they may be, will portray their intention in 
a completely neutral and unbiased way.       
 The interplay between a taxpayer’s ipse dixit and the objective set of facts provided to 
the court is a complex issue.  It is further confused through the use of different words to 
describe a taxpayer’s intention.  Words such as intention, object or purpose are often used 
synonymously to describe the taxpayer’s ipse dixit.  Botha JA clarified the meaning of 
intention somewhat in the case of SIR v The Trust Bank of Africa Ltd.2  The judge stated, 
  ‘In an enquiry as to the intention with which a transaction was entered into for the 
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purpose of the law relating to income tax, a court of law is not concerned with that kind of 
subjective state of mind required for the purposes of criminal law, but rather with the purpose 
for which the transaction was entered into.’       
 Botha JA is suggesting that intention from the perspective of criminal law is different 
to intention from the perspective of tax law.  This is an interesting departure and is examined 
in detail in an article published in the Chicago Law Review.3    
 From the perspective of criminal law intent, motive, purpose and have distinct 
meanings.  These distinctions are often of vital importance in handing down a judgment for 
criminal cases.  The question is whether it is necessary to distinguish between these terms in 
the context of tax law.  To clarify these terms for the purposes of criminal law, the author 
uses a classic example.  A defendant aimed a pistol at a person he wished to shoot.  He pulled 
the trigger.  The bullet hit a bystander who was directly in the line of fire.  The marked man 
was unharmed.            
 The defendant’s purpose in this case would be what he aimed to get out of the act of 
pointing and firing the gun.  In this case it would be to shoot the marked man with the bullet.  
His intent would depend on the physical facts of the case.  If the bystander, whom the 
defendant hit was not directly in the line of fire of his intended target, it may be said that he 
did not intend to harm the victim.  This would change if the bystander was in fact directly in 
front of the target man.  It could then be said that the defendant intended to harm the victim 
(bystander.)            
 The motive of the defendant would be his reasoning behind the act.  Why did the 
defendant want to hit the marked man? The motive is of critical importance in deciding the 
outcome of a criminal case.  It may mean the difference between self-defence and murder.  If 
the marked man was about to shoot the defendant, the defendant’s motive would be one of 
self-defence. If the marked man was sleeping with the defendant’s wife, the defendant’s 
motive would be one of revenge.   
In the case of criminal proceedings the acceptability of the motive plays a decisive role in the 
judgment.  Self-defence being a more acceptable motive then revenge.  The question now is 
whether it is critical to distinguish between these terms in the context of tax law.    
 In the case of CIR v Pick ‘n Pay Employee Share Purchase Trust, Smalberger JA said 
the following when dealing intention,       
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 ‘Contemplation is not to be confused with intention in the above sense.  In a tax case 
one is not concerned with what possibilities, apart from his actual purpose, the taxpayer 
foresaw and with which he reconciled himself.  One is solely concerned with his object, his 
aim, his actual purpose.’ 4        
 From this passage the judge seems to be inferring that tax law is not concerned with 
the side effects (whether accidental or not) which may arise from the act. In tax law we are 
concerned with the actual purpose underlying the act.  In the above example, the defendant’s 
actual purpose was to shoot the marked man.  The fact that the defendant hit a bystander, 
would not be relevant from a tax law perspective.  However if that side effect was not only 
contemplated, but inevitable the situation may be different.  It seems unrealistic to take no 
notice of an inevitable side-effect of an act perpetrated by a taxpayer.  This point is made by 
the judge in the case of CIR v Pick ‘n Pay Employee Share Purchase Trust as discussed later 
in this paper.  If the effect of a scheme is an inevitable generation of profit, it is likely to be 
considered a purpose of the scheme.         
 The passage above also seems to suggest that, ‘purpose’, ‘object’, ‘aim’ and 
‘intention’ are in fact interchangeable.  Interesting is that the theme amongst cases in New 
Zealand is to differentiate between the above terms.      
 In Plimmer v CIR (1958) NZLR 1475 it was held that     
 ‘A man’s purpose is usually, and more naturally, understood as the object which he 
has in view or in mind, but in ordinary language purpose connotes something added to 
intention and the two words are not ordinarily regarded as synonymous.’   
 The distinction between motive/purpose and intention has been made in other areas of 
South African law.  A good example is the case of Hippo Quarries (Tvl) (Pty) Ltd v Eardley6, 
where the court was asked to determine whether a contract to transfer a right was genuine.  
Judge Neinaber had this to say,        
 ‘Motive and purpose differ from intention.  If the purpose of the parties is unlawful, 
immoral or against public policy, the transaction will be ineffectual even if the intention to 
cede is genuine.  That is a principle of law.  Conversely, if their intention to cede is not 
genuine, because the real purpose of the parties is something other than cession, their 
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ostensible transaction will likewise be ineffectual.  That is because law disregards 
simulation.  But where, as here, the purpose is legitimate and the intention is genuine, such 
intention, all things being equal, will be implemented.’      
 The above passage confirms the previous submissions that motive is the reason 
behind the act.  It is the reason why the defendant fired the gun (revenge/self-defence etc.)  
The above passage also confirms that where the purpose/motive is unlawful or immoral the 
transaction itself will be invalid.  As a result there can be no valid contract of sale between a 
supplier and dealer of drugs for instance, because their motives are illegal despite the fact that 
the contract they conclude may meet the requirements to be a valid contract of sale.  The 
dealer and supplier may genuinely intend to enter into a valid contract of sale; however the 
fact that the goods transferred are of an illegal nature means the contract itself can never be 
valid.              
 It seems tax legislation may be different, as shown by CIR v Delagoa Bay Cigarette 
Ltd7 where it was held that the legality of a business was not relevant in determining tax 
liability.  Judge Bristowe J had the following to say,      
 ‘I do not think it is material for the purpose of this case whether the business carried 
on by the company was legal or illegal. Excess profits duty, like income tax, is leviable on all 
incomes exceeding the specified minimum, and after making the prescribed calculations and 
deducting the exemptions, abatement and deductions enumerated in the statute. The source of 
the income is immaterial.’         
 This shows that tax legislation is not concerned with any illegal motives that may be 
present in a transaction or scheme.  Tax legislation is merely concerned with whether the 
intention between the parties is genuine.        
 The idea is strengthened with the findings of MP Finance v CSARS8 where the court 
held that an illegal contract may have fiscal consequences.  The case dealt with a pyramid 
scheme where the taxpayer argued it had not ‘received’ amounts from investors, because it 
still had a legal obligation to repay.  However the taxpayer had never had any intention to 
retain investors’ money until the repayment date.  The taxpayer used the investor’s money for 
its own benefit and as such the amounts received from investors was considered income 
despite the fact that the scheme was illegal.  The legality of the scheme was of no relevance 
to the tax consequences.          
 In conclusion it seems that South African courts have not seen the differences 
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between motive/purpose and intention as critical to the outcome of tax cases as such they 
have not clearly distinguished the terms.       
 As Botha JA stated in The Trust Bank of Africa9 case, tax courts are not concerned 
with a taxpayer’s subjective state of mind.  The court is concerned with the taxpayer’s actual 
intention.  This seems to suggest that motive, as distinguished in criminal law is not relevant 
for the purposes of tax law.  However motive drives intention and in most cases may be 
difficult to clearly distinguish.  For the remainder of this paper the words purpose/motive and 
intention are used interchangeably.  
 
III THE ROLE OF INTENTION 
ITC 118510 provides a useful summation of the interplay between the taxpayer’s intention 
and the facts and circumstances presented to the court.  The judge explained that it is often 
difficult to ascertain the true intention of the taxpayer; however this does not preclude the 
court from giving a taxpayer’s intention due importance in the decision.  What is apparent is 
that the intention of a taxpayer cannot stand alone as an independent test.  It must be 
considered with reference to the facts and circumstances presented before the court.  Where a 
taxpayer’s intention proves to be incongruous to the presented facts, their intention may be 
disregarded and the effect/outcome of the transaction may be taxed.  The struggle between 
the concept of intention of a transaction and its effect will form the basis of this paper.   
 The case of CIR v Pick ‘n Pay Employee Share Purchase Trust11, shows this struggle 
between intention and effect clearly.  The taxpayer was the Pick ‘n Pay Employee Share 
Purchase Trust (the Trust), which was formed to benefit qualifying employees working for 
Pick ‘n Pay.  The trust acquired shares in various ways and sold them to qualifying 
employees at the market value at the time of acceptance of their application.  Employees were 
allowed to pay for the shares 5 years after acquisition (but no later than 10 years after 
acquisition.)            
 If the employee’s services were terminated within 5 years, or at any time due to 
dishonest or fraudulent conduct, the Trust was obliged to acquire the relevant shares for the 
amount of the employee debt.         
 In the 1982, 1983 and 1984 years of assessment the trust made profits. The 
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11 Supra note 4.	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commissioner taxed these profits on account that the sale of the shares was of a revenue 
nature.            
 Smalberger JA relied on a concept used in both the Natal Estates Ltd v SIR 197512 as 
well as Elandsheuwel Farming (Edms) Bpk v SBI 197813 to decide the case.  The concept 
was whether the taxpayer was engaged in a “scheme of profit making.”  Smalberger JA 
concluded that a business should have a profit making purpose.  The judge went on to say, 
‘The application of this test involves a consideration of the objectives of the taxpayer (the 
Trust) and what its purpose, or if there was more than one, what its dominant purpose was.’
 The trust was created to serve as a way to allocate shares to qualifying employees.  
This was the stated intention for the creation of the trust.  The trust was not created to buy 
shares and sell them at a profit.  That being said, the trust did in fact make a profit for 3 
consecutive years of assessment.  In other words one of the effects of implementing the 
scheme was the generation of profit.        
 However, quite critically, the generation of profit was due to the scheme not 
performing at its full potential.  The profit generated was due to the forfeiture provision 
specified in the scheme.  The profit was generated through the repurchase of shares resulting 
from employees resigning or being fired for misconduct.  The generation of profit also 
required a number of other variables (such as dates of resignation compared with dates of 
acquisition of the shares.)  None of these variables could have been controlled by the Trust.  
The trust could not choose when to buy and sell shares.  All these decisions were taken by the 
obligations laid out in the scheme. The profit is as a result an incidental by-product of the 
scheme.            
 Smalberger JA went on to say that the situation may have been different had the 
generation of profit been an inevitable effect of the scheme.  The scheme made a loss in the 
1985 year of assessment, which lends creditability to the fact that profits were not an 
inevitable effect of the scheme.   
Another case, which dealt with the struggle between the purpose and effect of a transaction is 
the case of Warner Lambert SA (Pty) Ltd v CSARS.14  Conradie JA had the following to say 
on the matter, ‘It is quite easy to mistake the purpose of an act for its consequences.’ Later on 
in the judgement he also stated,       
 ‘The consequences of an act often proclaim its purpose.  After all, a person is 
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presumed to have intended the natural consequences of his acts.  Nevertheless, a Court must 
look carefully at the evidence.  If there is credible evidence about a taxpayer’s purpose, it is 
not open to the court to turn what is in reality a consequence into a purpose and ascribe that 
to the taxpayer.’          
 In the Warner Lambert case, the deductibility of social responsibility expenditure was 
called into question.  The taxpayer, which was a subsidiary of an American company, 
incurred certain expenditure in order to continue trading in South Africa.  The expenditure 
related to a code called the Sullivan Code, which was introduced to govern the conduct of 
American companies in apartheid South Africa.  The deductibility of this expenditure was 
questioned for a number a reasons.  The question relevant to this paper was whether the 
expenditure was laid out for the purposes of trade.      
 The commissioner argued that the expenditure incurred served three purposes.  The 
first purpose was saving the parent company from potential embarrassment and negative 
economic consequences, which may have followed had the subsidiary not paid the money.  
The second purpose was one of pure altruism and the third purpose was the protection of the 
taxpayer’s income-earning structure.        
 The commissioner then went on to argue that expenditure incurred for the benefit of 
the group is not deductible, using the case of Solaglass Finance Company (Pty) Ltd v CIR15 
to substantiate the argument.  The benefit derived by the group is not deemed to be linked to 
the expenditure with a sufficient level of closeness.  As a result, the first purpose was not a 
trade purpose, if the argument of the commissioner is accepted.    
 Furthermore the commissioner argued that expenditure laid out for the purposes of 
pure altruism is not a trade purpose.  The commissioner used the case of Pick ‘n Pay 
Wholesalers16 to substantiate this argument.        
 As a result only the last purpose (protection of income-earning structure) was said to 
be a trade purpose according to the commissioner.  What is of interest is the case dealt with 
both the pre-1992 and post-1992 years of assessment.  Up to and including the 1992 year of 
assessment s23 (g) of the Act disallowed expenditure unless it had been, ‘wholly and 
exclusively laid out for the purposes of trade.’  From 1993 onwards, the definition was 
amended to allow expenditure incurred, ‘to the extent’ it was incurred for the purposes of 
trade.  Effectively from 1993 onwards, the expenditure may have been apportioned between 
trade and non-trade purposes.        
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 However Conradie JA found this to be unnecessary in his judgement.  The judge 
found that the altruism and group benefits were in fact effects of the social responsibility 
expenditure.  The real underlying reason or purpose of the expenditure was to avoid the loss 
of the taxpayer’s business in South Africa.  In order to do avoid losing its business in South 
Africa, the taxpayer had to comply with the Sullivan Code.  This required the taxpayer to 
incur this social responsibility expenditure.  The natural consequences of this expenditure 
were of an altruistic nature as well as being of benefit to the group.   
 Conradie JA thus found that the expenditure was laid out ‘wholly and exclusively’ for 
the purposes of trade.  It is clear that Conradie JA is implementing a composite test with no 
overriding factor, which determines the nature of the transaction.  In the above case the act of 
paying social responsibility expenditure was supported by a reasonable and commercial 
intention to save the South African business.  The court cannot take the altruistic effect of this 
expenditure and proclaim it to be the purpose.  The court cannot override a taxpayer’s stated 
intention unless there is evidence which shows a different or secondary intention. 
 There might be a counter argument based on CIR v Pick ‘n Pay Employee Share 
Purchase Trust17, where Smalberger JA stated that if profit generation was an inevitable 
effect of the scheme it may be seen as at least a secondary purpose for which it was created.  
If the altruism was an inevitable effect of the social responsibility expenditure it could be said 
that at the very least this was a secondary purpose of the taxpayer.  As such the respondent’s 
argument to apportion the expenditure in terms of section 23(g) may have merit.    
 A case where the test of the taxpayer’s intention was seemingly applied incorrectly 
was that of CSARS v Founders Hill (Pty) Ltd.18 In this case the compound test of a 
taxpayer’s intention was disregarded.      
 AECI owned an explosives factory with vacant land.  The manufacturing process of 
explosives had changed so that the buffer around the factory did not have to be so extensive.  
As a result AECI decided to sell or develop the land.  For this purpose they incorporated the 
taxpayer as a “realisation company.”  The land was sold to the taxpayer, which then sub-
divided, developed and disposed of it.  Judge Lewis JA held that the taxpayer purchased the 
land from AECI with the express intention of selling it at a profit.  As a result the taxpayer 
had embarked on the business of selling land. Consequently the taxpayer’s profits were gains 
‘made by operation of the business in carrying out a scheme for profit-making,’ and they 
therefore of a revenue nature. The appeal was therefore upheld and the profits were taxed as 
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being of a revenue nature (The tax court having ruled that the taxpayer had in fact acted as a 
realisation company and that the proceeds of the land sales were of a capital nature.) 
 In a critical review of the Founder’s Hill decision, Eddie Broomberg19 highlights 
various weaknesses in the judgement, one of which relates to the intention of the taxpayer. 
His review shows the over simplification of the test to determine whether a taxpayer is 
trading.  According to the judgement, if a taxpayer acquires an asset for resale, the taxpayer is 
trading.  However, this test neglects the taxpayer’s intention.  As Broomberg says, ‘there 
cannot be a trade without an intention to trade.’ Broomberg uses the decision laid down by 
CIR v Pick ‘n Pay Employee Share Purchase Trust20.  The scale of the Trust’s buying and 
selling of shares in the above case, would suggest the Trust was involved in share dealing 
activities.  However the purpose of the trust as stated earlier was to provide shares to 
qualifying employees.  In the same way this taxpayer was solely incorporated as a vehicle to 
realise the land sold to it by AECI.  Its purpose was to realise the assets on behalf of its 
shareholders, being the original owners of the asset and then distribute the proceeds to those 
shareholders (AECI).  The taxpayer never acted beyond this mandate and thus could not be 
considered to be trading in its own right.        
 It seems that the intention of a realisation company is synonymous with that of its 
creator, being the sole shareholder.  The mere interposition of a realisation company should 
not alter the nature of an asset, provided the realisation company does not trade in its own 
right.  As is shown by the above case the test of a taxpayer’s intention is complex and has 
been applied incorrectly in the past.  It involves an enquiry into the true and underlying 
intention of the taxpayer.  The realisation company was created to resell land at a profit.  
However this was not the underlying intention of the taxpayer.  The taxpayer formed part of a 
larger scheme to dispose of excess land not needed by AECI, which is the underlying 
intention behind the scheme.  
 
III(a)  Share Disposals 
Disposals of shares have typically been contentious from a tax perspective.  Numerous cases 
have been argued in order to ascertain whether the disposal is of a capital or revenue nature.  
In other words whether the taxpayer is trading in shares and has entered into a profit making 
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scheme.  The issues arise, because of the homogenous nature of shares.  Shares in most 
companies are perfectly interchangeable and easily traded.  Investors/traders may also hold 
the same shares for vastly different reasons.  Added to this, is the fact that shares have 
become very easily transferable in recent times.      
 Shares are not held for their aesthetic value, unlike paintings.  As such the reason for 
holding shares is solely to earn a return on an investment.  It is accepted that the disposal of 
shares passively invested will be of a capital nature.  The difficulty arises when an investor 
begins to actively switch between shares to maximize his/her return.  This is where the true 
intention of the taxpayer needs to be ascertained.  In certain instances the intention of a 
taxpayer is disregarded completely in favour of the facts and circumstances presented to the 
court. This may be the case where the intention of a taxpayer is based on the incorrect 
interpretation or understanding of the law.21  An example of this would be the case of Barnato 
Holdings Ltd v SIR22.  The case involved a company who genuinely believed they were 
holding shares as capital assets.  However the taxpayer applied the incorrect test in order to 
determine the nature of the shares.  The test the company applied was in fact far less stringent 
then the applicable test applied by the courts.  As a result the distinction the company drew 
was of no relevance to the court when deciding the nature of the shares.  
 There are in fact numerous other cases dealing whether share disposals by companies 
were in fact capital or revenue in nature.  An underlying theme is shared amongst the 
majority of these cases; namely the idea of a secondary purpose or intention.  The idea of a 
secondary purpose or intention is tackled in Blum’s Paper.23  The paper askes a number of 
questions regarding the practicality of ascertaining a taxpayer’s supposed ‘primary’ and 
‘secondary’ purpose.  In reality it is accepted that a taxpayer may enter into a transaction with 
more than one purpose in mind.  However distinguishing between a secondary purpose and 
an incidental effect of a transaction does provide some difficulties.  The relevant questions 
asked in the Blum’s paper are: What constitutes a major/significant purpose and how do we 
distinguish this from a secondary purpose?  In order for the purpose to be considered 
‘primary’ does it merely need to be more significant than any other purpose? Or does its 
importance have to outweigh all other purposes added together. As an example say I enter 
into a scheme to buy shares.  I do this in order to save for my retirement.  This is my stated 
intention.  However, I also know a lot about shares and as a result I will switch investments 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Clegg D Income Tax in South Africa (2013)  ch 5.2.1 available at 
http://beta.mylexisnexis.co.za.ezproxy.uct.ac.za/Index.aspx  accessed on 2 Novemeber 2013. 
22 Barnato Holdings Ltd v SIR 1978 (2) SA 440 (A). 
23 Walter J Blum op cit note 3.  
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on a regular basis to obtain the highest return from my investment.  It is accepted that one of 
my purposes is to save for my retirement.  How do we determine whether the potential gains 
made are an incidental effect of the intended purpose (to save for retirement) or a secondary 
purpose?  The tax consequences are quite different depending on whether the gains are 
deemed an incidental effect or a secondary purpose.  If the gains are found to be an incidental 
effect of a scheme, they will be capital in nature as the primary purpose is long-term 
investment.  However if the gains are seen as a secondary purpose, they will be revenue in 
nature.  It is accepted that payments to a pension fund, would in no way constitute a profit 
making scheme.  The taxpayer is not involved in where the money is invested.  It is a passive 
earing of income.  On the other end of the scale, if the taxpayer were to constantly watch their 
investment and switch in and out of stocks on a regular basis, it would be accepted as a profit 
making scheme.  The taxpayer’s stated intention is still, however to save for their retirement. 
Nussbaum v CIR24 dealt with a similar situation as the example above.  Howie JA held,  
 ‘By keeping a constant watch over his portfolio and “farming” it assiduously, the 
taxpayer had manifested a secondary purpose of dealing in shares for a profit, 
notwithstanding that his primary purpose had been to maximise dividend income.’ 
 This shows that although a taxpayer’s stated intention may be to save for retirement.  
The way this is done, may display a secondary trading purpose.    
 The case of African Life Investment Corporation (Pty) Ltd v SIR25 shows this 
principle strongly.  The taxpayer was a subsidiary of The African Life Assurance Society Ltd.  
The memorandum of incorporation (MOI) stated that the company was formed to operate as 
an investment company.  The investments were not to constitute trading stock and the 
company was not authorised to deal in shares.  The narrowly defined MOI makes the 
intention of the taxpayer clear. On the surface it appears the taxpayer would be holding the 
shares on capital account.  However the investment policy devised by the taxpayer was to 
maximise the return of capital employed.  In order to achieve this, the taxpayer needed to 
switch out of investments providing unacceptable dividend pay-outs and into investments 
providing better returns.  The taxpayer made profits on sale of these shares, which the 
commissioner attempted to tax as trading income.  The court agreed, stating that dividend 
yield and capital appreciation are inseparably linked.  Steyn CJ held in the judgement that the 
taxpayer had a composite purpose or intention.  The stated intention was to maximise the 
return on investment, however this inevitably lead to a profit as a result of switching shares.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 CIR v Nussbaum 1996 (4) SA 1156 (A).	  
25 African Life Investments Corporation (Pty) Ltd v SIR 1969 (4) SA 259 (A). 
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The taxpayer countered that the effect was merely incidental and the dominant purpose was 
the receipt of dividends.  The taxpayer was relying on an argument succinctly stated in the 
case of CIR v Pick ‘n Pay Employee Share Purchase Trust.26 Smalberger JA, said the 
following when dealing intention,        
  ‘Contemplation is not to be confused with intention in the above sense.  In a tax case 
one is not concerned with what possibilities, apart from his actual purpose, the taxpayer 
foresaw and with which he reconciled himself.  One is solely concerned with his object, his 
aim, his actual purpose.’        
 Smalberger JA is clearly showing the difference between the intention with which a 
taxpayer enters into a transaction and the potential effects of that transaction.  The tax 
consequences are generally based on the underlying intention of the taxpayer. 
 However, Smalberger JA did qualify his judgement in the Pick ‘n Pay case, by saying 
that the situation may be different where profits are an inevitable effect of a scheme.  If 
profitable sales of shares are inevitable given the nature of the scheme, it would seem to 
suggest that this was intended by the taxpayer.  As a result at least a part of the reason why 
the taxpayer entered into the scheme was to derive a profit. In the case of African Life 
Investment Corporation (Pty) Ltd v SIR27, the court held that the profit making purpose was 
in fact a secondary purpose of the scheme (and not incidental.)  As such the profits were 
deemed to be of a revenue nature and taxed accordingly.     
 Another case, which could not be distinguished from African Life Investment 
Corporation (Pty) Ltd v SIR (69), was that of Barnato Holdings Ltd v SIR28.   As stated by 
Trollip JA in the above case; the question of whether an investment shareholding company 
will be deemed to be carrying on a secondary business of dealing in shares for profit is a 
question of fact.  It is a question of degree.  The volume of trading and time taken to ‘watch’ 
over the investments will be relevant factors in deciding the nature of the disposals. 
 The introduction of section 9C in the Act (its predecessor being section 9B) deems the 
sale of certain shares held for longer than 3 years to be of a capital nature. Section 9C applies 
to shares, which meet the criteria of a qualifying share as defined in section 9C. A qualifying 
share being an equity share, which has been disposed of by a taxpayer, if the taxpayer 
immediately prior to such disposal had been the owner of that share for a continuous period 
of at least three years.  The definition excludes certain shares, such as foreign listed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Supra note 4.	  
27 Supra note 25. 
28 Supra note 22. 
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companies.  In this way the legislation disregards the intention of the taxpayer and taxes the 
outcome/effect of a transaction.        
 The taxpayer’s investment policy (intention) may mean shares are held for longer than 
3 years (incidental effect.) This incidental effect classifies the transaction as either capital or 
revenue in nature. SARS have indicated that section 9C was introduced to avoid the 
‘protracted legal disputes’ associated with the sale of shares.29  In effect SARS is following 
the canons of taxation; namely efficiency and certainty.30  However there may be certain 
instances where share traders would prefer the sale of shares to remain revenue in nature (i.e. 
if the tax consequences were favourable when compared with the application of section 9C.)  
The application of section 9C is not at the election of the taxpayer and as such the taxpayer 
would face the potentially adverse tax consequences without choice.  More research needs to 
be done on this area.  The question remains as to whether the legislation has promoted 
effective tax collection at the cost of neutrality.31 
 
III(b)  Tax Avoidance Situations        
III(b)(i)  Section 20A. Ring-fencing Assessed Losses of Certain Trades 
There are other instances where an objective review of the facts outweighs the taxpayer’s 
intention in deciding how a transaction should be taxed.  This is particularly evident in the 
section of tax legislation dealing with tax avoidance.  A taxpayer is less likely to give an 
objective statement regarding their intention if the transaction involves the possibility of tax 
avoidance.  It would be naïve to think that the objectivity of a taxpayer’s stated intention 
would not be influenced by the desire to avoid tax.     
 CSARS v Smith32 is another example of the struggle between the intention of the 
taxpayer and the effect of his actions as indicated by an objective assessment of the facts of 
the case.  The taxpayer was a medical practitioner who engaged in farming, mostly in his 
spare time.  He originally purchased a farm to angora goats and then converted to game 
farming.  At the time of buying the farm he did foresee that the farm would be profitable in 
the future (giving a time period of roughly 8 to 10 years.)  He eventually sold the farm due to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 SARS. ‘Interpretation  Note: No. 43 (Issue 4)’ available at 
http://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/LegalDoclib/Notes/LAPD-IntR-IN-2012-43%20-
%20Circumstances%20Disposal%20Shares%20Capital%20Nature%20Amounts.pdf 
Accessed on 8 January 2014. 
30 T S Emslie & D M Davis Income Tax Cases & Materials 3 ed (2011) 1. 
31 Ibid. 	  
32 CSARS v Smith 2002 (6) SA 621 (SCA). 
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poor health.  He subsequently bought another farm, once again with the intention of farming 
game.  Both farms ran at substantial losses throughout the period of ownership.  The taxpayer 
offset these losses against the taxable income from his medical practise.  In 1996 the 
commissioner notified the taxpayer that he would not allow the losses incurred in 1992, 1993, 
1994 and 1995 to be set off.  The reason given by the commissioner was that there had been 
no reasonable prospect of making a profit.        
 The cases relied upon by both councils created two schools of thought.  The idea 
relied upon by the commissioner was the idea laid down by Smalberger J in ITC 1319.  
Smalberger disagreed with a statement made in the 9th edition of Silke on South African 
Income Tax when he said,          
 ‘In so far as the test propounded by Silke purports to be an entirely subjective one, I 
do not agree with it.  It seems to me that before a person can be said to be carrying on 
farming operations there must be a genuine intention to farm, coupled with a reasonable 
prospect that an ultimate profit will be derived, thereby incorporating an objective element 
into the test.  To hold otherwise would make it well-nigh impossible for the commissioner to 
determine whether or not to allow farming losses as a deduction from other income, for he 
must needs adopt an objective approach when doing so.’33     
 If there was any doubt that Smalberger had an independent profit criteria in mind, this 
doubt is put to rest in the following extract,        
 ‘In all the circumstances the indications are that in 1976 and 1977 the appellant, 
despite his ipse dixit to the contrary, had no genuine intention of farming and was, at best, 
merely marking time until he could subdivide and dispose of the bulk of his property.  It is, 
however, not necessary to come to any firm decision on this point as it appears in any event 
that at the relevant time…the appellant had no reasonable prospects of ultimately farming on 
a profitable basis…’34          
 The judgement of Smalberger J above makes it clear, that a reasonable prospect of 
profit should be an independent objective test applied separately to that of the the intention of 
a taxpayer.  The above argument attempts to use the objective facts of the case to over-rule 
the intention of the taxpayer.  The commissioner has ‘objectively’ reviewed the taxpayer’s 
case after the fact and concluded that there was never a reasonable prospect of profit.  As a 
result the taxpayer may not offset the losses sustained from other taxable income.  The 
commissioner is attempting to replace a forward looking subjective test of intention, with a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




backward looking objective review of the outcome/ effects of the business venture.  The 
commissioner, in 1996 effectively decided that he would not allow the set off for the years 
1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, because there had been no reasonable prospect of making a profit.  
The commissioner is using the exact science of hindsight to determine the tax consequences 
of what is by its very nature a risky business in terms of commercial success.  
 Heher AJA touched on this point agreeing with the following extract of a tax case in 
New Zealand.  The Court of Appeal of New Zealand had the following to say in Grieve v 
CIR            
 ‘It is not suggested that it is the function of the income tax Acts, or of those who 
administer them, to dictate to the taxpayers in what business they shall (628) engage or how 
to run their business profitable or economically.  The Act must operate upon the result of a 
taxpayer’s activities as it finds them.  If a taxpayer is in fact engaged in two businesses, one 
profitable and the other showing a loss, the commissioner is not entitled to say he must close 
down the unprofitable business and cut his losses even if it might be better in his own 
interests and although it certainly would be better in the interests of the commissioner if he 
did so (Toolhey’s Ltd v COT for NWS (1922) 22 SR 432 at pp 440-1).  If the appellant 
succeeds and makes a profit it will plainly be taxable, and it is difficult to see how his 
activities could at that moment of time be transmogrified from an indulgence in a somewhat 
unusual form of recreation into the carrying on of a business.  I am satisfied that the 
appellant is seeking to establish himself at Winlaton as a recognised breeder of high-class 
stud stock, and that while he is prepared to make losses to achieve this ambition he has a 
genuine belief that he will be able eventually to make the business pay.  Indeed, unless he can 
do so, his experience will hardly be an encouragement to others to emulate his example.’ 35
 The outcome of the case of CSARS v Smith36 was that although profitability may be a 
contributing factor in assessing the reasonability of a taxpayer’s intention, it may not stand 
alone as an independent test.  It is not for the commissioner to judge the commercial viability 
of a business venture using a backward looking test with no reference to the taxpayer’s 
intention at the time of entering into said business venture.  The judge in an Australian case 
summarised the matter crisply, ‘It is enough to travel hopefully even if one is never destined 
to arrive.’37          
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36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid.  
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 That being said, CSARS v Smith38 deals with a taxpayer who is effectively farming as 
a hobby.  His income was derived from a successful medical practice.  As a result it is not 
unreasonable to suggest that the taxpayer may have entered into the scheme partly to reduce 
his tax liability.  Schemes where the avoidance of tax liability is a possibility generally render 
the stated intention of the taxpayer less reliable.  As a result more emphasis is placed on an 
objective review of the facts.         
 The decision handed down in the Smith case above lead to the introduction of section 
20A into legislation.  The reason for the introduction is explained in Explanatory 
Memorandum on the Revenue Laws Amendment Bill, 2003.  The memorandum explains that 
not all activities are trades, even if the taxpayer labelled or even intended the activity to be so.  
The intention behind the introduction of section 20A is to ring-fence losses incurred in 
respect of “hobby” activities in order to stop these losses being set-off against the taxpayer’s 
other income.  This ‘other’ income usually takes the form of professional fees or a salary.  In 
the Smith case, the taxpayer was a doctor who earned professional fees.  The memorandum 
goes on to say that a ‘facts and circumstances’ test will be used to ascertain whether the 
activity constitutes a ‘hobby’ activity.  The intention of the taxpayer is thus accorded little (if 
not no weight), in favour of an objective review of the facts.39  The commissioner uses the 
argument put forward by Smalberger J in ITC 1319 as sited above in this paper to defend this 
test.  The judge argued that the absence of objectivity in the test would make it, ‘well-nigh 
impossible for the commissioner to determine whether or not to allow farming losses as a 
deduction from other income.’  For this practical reason, the intention of the taxpayer takes 
on very little weight in determining whether an activity is deemed to be a ‘hobby’ activity or 
a ‘suspect trade.’ Subsection (1) of section 20A explains the general rule, which ring-
fences assessed losses from suspect trades as listed in subsection (2.)  If a trade is deemed to 
be suspect trade, the loss arising from this trade may not be set-off against other income of 
the taxpayer. Subsection (2) explains that section 20A is only applicable where the taxpayer 
earns sufficient taxable income to be taxed at the highest marginal rate of tax.  The taxable 
income must be taken before the set-off of the assessed loss in question.   
 There are two ways a trade can be deemed to be a suspect trade.  Either it is explicitly 
listed in section 20(A)(2)(b) or the trade has incurred losses for at least 3 years in a 5 year 
period.  Included in the list of suspect trades is farming (unless done on a full time basis.)
 Section 20A(3) effectively provides an escape clause in certain circumstances.  It 
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allows the taxpayer to prove that the trade is not a ‘hobby’ activity or suspect trade, despite 
the fact that it meets the criteria as set out in section 20A(2)(a) or section 20A(2)(b).
 Section 20A(3) states that the provisions of subsection (1) do not apply in respect of 
an assessed loss incurred by a person during any year of assessment from carrying on any 
trade contemplated in subsection (2)(a) or (b), where that trade constitutes a business in 
respect of which there is a reasonable prospect of deriving taxable income, within a 
reasonable period.  The legislation goes on to name the objective factors, which would decide 
whether commissioner believes the trade has a reasonable prospect of deriving taxable 
income.           
 The notion of a ‘reasonable prospect of deriving taxable income’ has been added to 
the legislation in Section 20(A)(3).  The legislation has favoured the argument stated by 
Smalberger J in ITC 1319 as shown in the use of the above term.  The legislation now 
suggests that ‘a reasonable prospect of deriving taxable income’ will stand as an independent 
criteria in determining whether a trade will be deemed to be a suspect trade.  The legislation 
has favoured the test laid down by Smalberger J, which treated the taxpayer’s intention and 
the ability of the activity to generate a profit as separate criteria.  The original test required 
that both criteria be met in order for the activity to be deemed to be a bona fide trade.  Section 
20A takes this test one step further as it makes no mention of the taxpayer’s intention, 
effectively disregarding it in the decision.       
 The reasons for this are quite clear.  The possibility of a taxpayer disguising private 
consumption by labelling a hobby as a trade is high.  It is naïve to think that the taxpayer’s 
stated intention would be completely free from bias given the potential tax advantages at 
stake.  As is stated in the explanatory memorandum, section 20A was introduced, ‘as a means 
to uncover these artificially labelled trades.’40  Furthermore, section 20A only applies to 
natural person who earn sufficient taxable income to be taxed at the highest rate of tax, which 
currently stands at R638 601.  Thus section 20A only applies to those taxpayers who have the 
means to disguise a hobby as a trade.      
 Nevertheless, the legislation effectively imposes a model of how a business should be 
run in order for it to have a ‘reasonable prospect’ of taxable income.  Effectively, the 
legislation is asking the question of whether a reasonable businessman would have structured 
his affairs and made the same decisions as the taxpayer in question.  As a result, if a taxpayer 
fails to live up to these ‘standards’ of business he will deemed to have no genuine business 
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motive, despite what his actual intention may have been.  This may be appropriate given the 
fact that section 20A only applies to high income earners.  It assumes that because the 
taxpayer is at the highest marginal tax rate, he will have the knowledge to live up to these 
‘standards’ of business as outlined in section 20A(3.)     
 Take the scenario of a taxpayer wishing to start a vineyard from scratch.  Let us say it 
takes three years for the vines to grow to such an extent that they are able to produce wine.  
Add to this the fact that some wine needs to be aged before it may be sold.  During this time 
the farm will incur expenditure and will undoubtedly end up in an assessed loss position. 
   Farming is a suspect trade (unless done on a full time basis section 20(A)(2)(b).)  
These losses will be automatically ring-fenced from the taxpayer’s other taxable income 
(provided the taxpayer is at the highest marginal tax rate.)  The only hope for the taxpayer is 
that the trade is deemed to be carried on with a ‘reasonable prospect of deriving taxable 
income.’ Section 20A(3).         
 In this situation it seems the taxpayer will struggle to prove the ‘standards’ outlined in 
section 20A(3) in order to avoid the assessed loss being ring-fenced.   
 The first ‘standard’ outlined in section 20A(3)(a) looks at the proportion of gross 
income derived from trade in that year of assessment in relation to the amount of allowable 
deductions incurred.  The majority of farms are unlikely to turn any kind of income in their 
initial stages of development.  A wine farm for instance would take a substantial period of 
time to begin producing wine.  As a result it is likely, that most farms would fail this 
‘standard’ initially.         
 Some of the other factors listed are: the level of activities; the commercial manner and 
the business plans of the taxpayer.  It looks to be a difficult task to prove that a loss making 
farm will be deemed to be carried on with a ‘reasonable prospect of deriving taxable 
income.’  If we continue with our example of the wine farm, assume that the criteria under 
section 20A(3) were applied and it has been decided that the business has no ‘reasonable 
prospect of deriving taxable income.’ The farm made losses for 5 years as the vines grew.  As 
the yield improved, the farm made a taxable profit in year 6.  It has subsequently made profits 
ever since. Is the continued profit from year 6 not evidence enough that there was a 
reasonable prospect of profit from year 1 to 5?  If there was no reasonable prospect of profit 
does that make these profits fortuitous gains and therefor capital in nature?   The last question 
is unlikely to hold any water as an argument, but it does show the unbalanced nature of this 
provision.             
 In the Smith case, the continued losses caused the commissioner to take notice and 
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ultimately deem that there was ‘no reasonable prospect’ of making a profit.  The 
commissioner did lose the case.  However the introduction of section 20A, would most 
probably have changed the outcome.  The use of the term, ‘reasonable prospect of deriving 
taxable income’ in section 20A(3) shows the heavy reliance placed on the argument of 
Smalberger J in ITC 1319.  It would be interesting to note whether continued profits after 
initial losses would be enough to indicate that in fact the business had a reasonable prospect 
of profit.  If this is so, the balance of the assessed loss would not be ring-fenced under section 
20A and would be allowed to be set-off against the taxpayer’s other income.  Section 20A(5) 
suggests that this would not be possible.  Section 20A(5) states any balance of assessed loss, 
which has been ring-fenced in terms of section 20A may only be set off against income 
derived from carrying on that trade (i.e. the trade that created the assessed loss.)  If we apply 
this to the wine farm example, say the commissioner deemed that there was no reasonable 
prospect of profit after the first 5 years of operation of the farm, due to the continued losses.  
The losses were ring-fenced as a result.  The wine farm began to make a profit from year 6 
and continued to do so into the future.  The continued profit might signify that there was in 
fact a reasonable prospect of profit; however the balance of the assessed loss would not be 
allowed to be set-off against the taxpayer’s other income.  It would continue to reverse 
against the income of the wine farm. The legislation does allow for the nature of the activity 
in determining whether it is a suspect trade.  Section 20A(3)(d) compares the number of years 
a trade has been making losses to the total number of years the taxpayer has been carrying on 
the particular trade.  A higher proportion of loss making years may suggest a suspect trade.  
However the sub-section does make provision for the nature of the trade.  The explanatory 
memorandum uses the example of an olive farm as an activity with a long start-up period.41
 The question remains at what point in time will the trade be deemed to be as suspect 
trade?  In the case of “hobby” farming it will be deemed to be a suspect trade immediately as 
it is listed.  For other activities, the existence of continued losses may signify a suspect trade.  
The next question is when will the assessment of ‘ reasonable prospect of taxable income’  
be made?  Will it be made at the same time that the trade is deemed to be suspect? The 
legislation refers to a ‘reasonable period’ which provides little guidance in this regard. 
 A likely interpretation is that the operation of the trade will be examined over a 
number of years, as in the Smith case.  The taxpayer will have to prove there is a reasonable 
prospect of profit for the trade given the information present during the years under review.  
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The evidence given by the taxpayer will be evaluated with reference to the actual losses 
sustained during the time period under review.  If the activity is then deemed not to meet the 
requirements of section 20(A)(3) the losses will be ring-fenced.  Once ring-fenced, the losses 
cannot be reclassified, even if there are continued profits after the assessment.  This seems to 
suggest the time period under examination is vitally important in coming to the correct 
decision as to whether there is a ‘reasonable prospect of deriving taxable income.’  What is 
clear is that at no point are we concerned with what the taxpayer was attempting to achieve 
from this activity or trade.  This piece of legislation is driven only be results or effects of a 
transaction.  If the effect of your activity makes losses, it is up to you to prove that the 
activity was a bona fide trade.  The evidence you need to present is not focused on your state 
of mind or intention, but on your actions i.e. how you went about this activity.  The reasoning 
is best described using the saying, ‘Actions speak louder than words.’ 
III(b)(ii)   Section 80A. Impermissible Tax Avoidance Arrangements 
The anti-avoidance provisions outlined in section 80A to section 80L of the Act were 
introduced on 2 November 2006 and are applicable to any arrangement or entered into on or 
after that date.  The previous version was contained in section 103(1) of the Act.  
Arrangements which could potentially fall into this section of the Act are always going to 
present a problem in terms of ascertaining a taxpayer’s intention.  The potential to avoid 
income tax creates a very real and tangible incentive to cloud stated intentions.  It is 
unrealistic to assume evidence given by a taxpayer in these instances to be free from self-
interest.  As such it becomes imperative for the court to examine the taxpayer’s stated 
intention in light of the facts of the case.  This strong reliance on the objective facts of the 
case does create the potential to overrule the taxpayer’s stated intention completely.
 This issue was clearly dealt with in the case of Secretary for Inland Revenue v 
Gallagher42.  The case dealt with the previous version of the anti-avoidance provision 
contained in section 103(1.)  In this case the court rejected the commissioner’s argument that 
an ‘objective’ test should be applied over a ‘subjective’ test in order to determine the purpose 
of the transaction, operation or scheme.  The court rejected the idea that the word ‘purpose’ 
as used in section 103(1) denotes an element of objectivity and in fact is synonymous with 
the word ‘effect.’ The court found that that word ‘purpose’ as used in section 103(1) of the 
act has the same subjective connotations as found elsewhere in the act, wherever such word is 
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used.  As this case dealt with the previous version (section 103) of the provision there is a 
question as to whether section 80A places the same reliance on the taxpayer’s subjective 
intention as the previous version.          
 This issue was addressed in an article written in The Taxpayer43.  The author came to 
the conclusion that principles laid down in Gallagher are equally applicable to section 80A.  
The author uses the point that an avoidance arrangement as defined in section 80L is an 
arrangement which results in a tax benefit.  Thus an effect of the transaction is the attainment 
of a tax benefit.  However to be an impermissible tax avoidance arrangement (as defined in 
section 80A) its sole or main purpose must be to obtain a tax benefit.  Thus the legislation is 
clearly distinguishing between the effect of a transaction and the purpose with which the 
taxpayer entered into the transaction. As such the author concludes that the intention of the 
taxpayer is still of relevance when deciding the tax consequences in section 80A.  Once it has 
been proved that an avoidance arrangement is present the onus then falls on the taxpayer to 
prove that the tax benefit received was not the sole or main purpose of the scheme.  This 
presumption of purpose is found in section 80(G)(1) and it places a strong burden of proof on 
the taxpayer.  Section 80(G) of the Act states,       
 ‘An avoidance arrangement is presumed to have been entered into or carried out for 
the sole or main purpose of obtaining a tax benefit unless and until the party obtaining a tax 
benefit proves that, reasonably considered in light of relevant facts and circumstances, 
obtaining a tax benefit was not the sole or main purpose of the avoidance arrangement.’
 This test has an element of objectivity.  The court is required to considered the ‘facts 
and circumstances’ surrounding the case together with the stated intention of the taxpayer.  It 
seems it is not enough for the taxpayer to explain other viable reasons for entering into the 
transaction.  The evidence given by the taxpayer must be consistent with an objective review 
of the ‘facts and circumstances.’ It is up to the taxpayer to prove that they are not within the 
realm of section 80A once a tax benefit is present and the other requirements of section 80A 
are met.  It is submitted that this is a difficult but not impossible task.    
 An interesting argument is provided Blum on intention and anti-avoidance.  The 
author examines a piece of legislation in American tax legislation not dissimilar to South 
African Income Tax anti-avoidance legislation. The extract of the legislation is provided 
below:           
 ‘The fact that the earnings and profits of a corporation are permitted to accumulate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




beyond the reasonable needs of the business shall be determinative of the purpose to avoid 
income tax with respect to shareholders, unless the corporation by preponderance of the 
evidence shall prove to the contrary.’44      
 This legislation has aspects, which are comparable to section 80(G)(1) Both pieces of 
legislation give a presumption of purpose.  In the above case if the accumulation of profit 
exceeds the ‘reasonable needs of the business’ the purpose is deemed to be that of the 
avoidance of income tax.  The taxpayer is then required to prove otherwise.  Interestingly the 
author states that where the reasonable needs test goes against the taxpayer there is only a 
small chance of proving a dominant purpose other than the proscribed one.  The author 
concludes later on that the subjective test has been reduced to the ‘last hope’ argument for the 
taxpayer.  It is clear that American legislation has merely persuasive significance in South 
African courts.  However the passage above does illustrate the strong burden of proof 
required in order to rebut the presumption of purpose outlined in section 80A.   
 A good example of where the underlying purpose of the transaction was the decisive 
factor in the decision is that of CIR v Conhage.45  The taxpayer required finance and as such 
concluded a sale and leaseback of some of its manufacturing plant and equipment.  The 
question was whether the scheme fell into the ambit of the previous anti-avoidance provision, 
section 103(1.)  The argument considered by the court was whether the sole or main purpose 
of the scheme was to obtain a tax benefit.  The court held that the true purpose of the scheme 
was to obtain finance.  The choice of the sale and leaseback, because of its tax efficient 
nature was not enough to make it the main or sole purpose of the scheme. As such the scheme 
was not deemed impermissible tax avoidance.  As concluded in the Taxpayer article, 
although the purpose test in section 80A remains subjective in nature, the courts will never 
accept the taxpayer’s stated intention without a comparison to the objective facts of the case.  
 
IV CONCLUSION 
In conclusion the intention of a taxpayer forms part of a compound test used by the courts to 
determine the true nature of a transaction.  A taxpayer’s intention will very rarely be taken at 
face value without an examination of the facts of the case.       
 It seems the complexity of modern transactions has caused ever increasing legislation 
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around the effects of a transaction in an attempt to obtain consistency in the application of the 
legislation.  Section 9C is an example of this as discussed earlier in the paper. 
 Section 80B to section 80E is another example of the legislation defining the effects 
or characteristics of a transaction which could fall into the ambit of its section.  These 
paragraphs describe effects and characteristics of schemes or transactions, which are likely to 
be impermissible tax avoidance arrangements.  These ‘guidelines’ where not present in 
previous versions of anti-avoidance legislation.  The question is whether the taxpayer’s 
intention will remain relevant in the future despite the movement towards taxing the effects 






















African Life Investments Corporation (Pty) Ltd v SIR 1969 (4) SA 259 (A). 
 
Barnato Holdings Ltd v SIR 1978 (2) SA 440 (A). 
 
CIR v Conhage (Pty) Ltd (formerly Tycon (Pty) Ltd 1999 (4) SA1149 (SCA). 
 
CIR v Delagoa Bay Cigarette Co. Ltd (1918 TPD 391). 
	  
CIR v Pick ‘n Pay Employee Share Purchase Trust 1987 (3) SA 453 (A). 
 
CIR v Pick’n Pay Wholesalers (Pty) Ltd 1987 (3) SA 453 (A). 
 
CIR v Nussbaum 1996 (4) SA 1156 (A). 
 
CSARS v Founders Hill (Pty) Ltd 2011 (5) SA 112 (SCA). 
 
CSARS v Smith 2002 (6) SA 621 (SCA). 
 
Elandsheuwel Farming (Edms) Bpk v SBI 1978 (1) SA 101 (A). 
 
Hippo Quarries (Transvaal) (Pty) Ltd. v Eardley (189/90) [1991] ZASCA 174. 
ITC 118. 
 
Malan v KBI, 1983 (3) SA 1 (A). 
 
MP Finance v CSARS 2007 (5) SA 521 (SCA). 
 
Natal Estates Ltd v SIR 1975 (4) SA 177 (A). 
 
Secretary for Inland Revenue v Gallagher (1978) 3 All SA 1 (A). 
 
SIR v Trust Bank of Africa Ltd 1975 (2) SA 652 (A). 
 
Solaglass Finance Co (Pty) Ltd v CIR 1991 (2) SA 257 (A). 
   















Books and Journals: 
 
Broomberg, E ‘NWK and Founders Hill’ The Taxpayer 187-197. 
 
Clegg D Income Tax in South Africa (2013)  ch 5.2.1 available at 
http://beta.mylexisnexis.co.za.ezproxy.uct.ac.za/Index.aspx accessed on 2 Novemeber 2013. 
 
Peter Dachs ‘Anti Tax-Avoidance Provision – is the Purpose Test Subjective or Objective?’ 
(2013) 62 The Taxpayer 183-185. 
 
PricewaterhouseCoopers ‘Purpose, intention, object, motive’ available at 
http://www.saica.co.za/integritax/2006/1421_Purpose_intention_object_and_motive.htm  
accessed on 20 August 2013. 
 
SARS ‘Explanatory Memorandum on The Revenue Laws Amendment Bill’ (2003).  
 
SARS ‘Interpretation  Note: No. 43 (Issue 4)’ available at 
http://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/LegalDoclib/Notes/LAPD-IntR-IN-2012-43%20-
%20Circumstances%20Disposal%20Shares%20Capital%20Nature%20Amounts.pdf 
accessed on 8 January 2014. 
 
T S Emslie & D M Davis Income Tax Cases & Materials 3 ed (2011). 
 
Walter J Blum ‘Motive, Intent and Purpose in Federal Income Taxation’ (1966-1967 ) 485 
The University of Chicago Law Review available at http://heinonline.org accessed 20 August 
2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28	  
	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
